Philosophy of Science 80 (1):119-142 (2013)

Authors
Kenny Easwaran
Texas A&M University
Abstract
Expected accuracy arguments have been used by several authors (Leitgeb and Pettigrew, and Greaves and Wallace) to support the diachronic principle of conditionalization, in updates where there are only finitely many possible propositions to learn. I show that these arguments can be extended to infinite cases, giving an argument not just for conditionalization but also for principles known as ‘conglomerability’ and ‘reflection’. This shows that the expected accuracy approach is stronger than has been realized. I also argue that we should be careful to distinguish diachronic update principles from related synchronic principles for conditional probability.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1086/668879
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 70,163
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

A Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism.James M. Joyce - 1998 - Philosophy of Science 65 (4):575-603.
Belief and the Will.Bas C. van Fraassen - 1984 - Journal of Philosophy 81 (5):235-256.
What Conditional Probability Could Not Be.Alan Hájek - 2003 - Synthese 137 (3):273--323.
The Toxin Puzzle.Gregory S. Kavka - 1983 - Analysis 43 (1):33-36.

View all 23 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Lockeans Maximize Expected Accuracy.Kevin Dorst - 2019 - Mind 128 (509):175-211.
Evidence: A Guide for the Uncertain.Kevin Dorst - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (3):586-632.
Rational Endorsement.Will Fleisher - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (10):2649-2675.
Updating for Externalists.J. Dmitri Gallow - 2021 - Noûs 55 (3):487-516.

View all 50 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2013-01-30

Total views
159 ( #73,651 of 2,506,511 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
2 ( #277,244 of 2,506,511 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes