Philosophical Studies 172 (12):3135-3143 (2015)

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Abstract
We argue that a certain version of pragmatic encroachment, according to which one knows that p only if one’s epistemic position with respect to p is practically adequate, has a problematic consequence: one can lose knowledge that p by getting evidence for p, and conversely, one can gain knowledge that p by getting evidence against p. We first describe this version of pragmatic encroachment, and then we defend that it has the problematic consequence. Finally, we deal with a worry that the consequence we find problematic is not, in fact, problematic.
Keywords Pragmatic encroachment  Evidence  Practical adequacy
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-015-0461-x
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References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and Practical Interests.Jason Stanley - 2005 - Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and Practical Interests.Jason Stanley - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (1):180-187.
Knowledge and Practical Interests.Jason Stanley - 2006 - Critica 38 (114):98-107.
What's Wrong with Moore's Argument?James Pryor - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):349–378.

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Citations of this work BETA

VIII—Moral Encroachment.Sarah Moss - 2018 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 118 (2):177-205.
Wagering on Pragmatic Encroachment.Daniel M. Eaton & Timothy Pickavance - 2017 - Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion 8:96-117.
Reply to Eaton and Pickavance.Brian Weatherson - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (12):3231-3233.

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