Kyla Ebels-Duggan
Northwestern University
I attempt to vindicate our authority to create new practical reasons for others by making choices of own own. In The Doctrine of Right Kant argues that we have an obligation to leave the Juridical State of Nature and found the state. In a less familiar passage in Religion within the Bounds of Mere Reason he argues for an obligation to leave what he calls the Ethical State of Nature and join together in the Moral Community. I read both texts as addressing and trying to resolve a tension between our individual freedom and our authority to make claims on one another. I explicate the political argument, and then develop the view that Kant sketches in the Religion, arguing that regarding others as capable of making choices that give you reasons to act is a condition of the full exercise of your autonomy.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 72,607
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Kant and the Second Person.Janis David Schaab - 2021 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 7 (4):494-513.
Kantian Constructivism and the Authority of Others.Aleksy Tarasenko-Struc - 2020 - European Journal of Philosophy 28 (1):77-92.
Kant’s Political Philosophy.Kyla Ebels-Duggan - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (12):896-909.
Critical Notice of Arthur Ripstein's Force and Freedom.Kyla Ebels-Duggan - 2011 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (4):549-573.

View all 16 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles


Added to PP index

Total views
96 ( #124,712 of 2,533,647 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
6 ( #117,385 of 2,533,647 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes