Question-Begging Arguments as Ones That Do Not Extend Knowledge

Philosophy and Progress 65 (1):125-144 (2019)
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In this article, I propose a formal criterion that distinguishes between deductively valid arguments that do and do not beg the question. I define the concept of a Never-failing Minimally Competent Knower (NMCK) and suggest that an argument begs the question just in case it cannot possibly assist an NMCK in extending his or her knowledge.



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Rainer Ebert
Oxford Centre for Animal Ethics

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References found in this work

Epistemic Operators.Fred Dretske - 1970 - Journal of Philosophy 67 (24):1007-1023.
The Legend of the Justified True Belief Analysis.Julien Dutant - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):95-145.
Begging the Question.David H. Sanford - 1972 - Analysis 32 (6):197-199.

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