Authors
Martin Smith
University of Edinburgh
Philip A. Ebert
University of Stirling
Abstract
The notion of risk plays a central role in economics, finance, health, psychology, law and elsewhere, and is prevalent in managing challenges and resources in day-to-day life. In recent work, Duncan Pritchard (2015, 2016) has argued against the orthodox probabilistic conception of risk on which the risk of a hypothetical scenario is determined by how probable it is, and in favour of a modal conception on which the risk of a hypothetical scenario is determined by how modally close it is. In this article, we use Pritchard’s discussion as a springboard for a more wide-ranging discussion of the notion of risk. We introduce three different conceptions of risk: the standard probabilistic conception, Pritchard’s modal conception, and a normalcy conception that is new (though it has some precursors in the psychological literature on risk perception). Ultimately, we argue that the modal conception is ill-suited to the roles that a notion of risk is required to play and explore the prospects for a form of pluralism about risk, embracing both the probabilistic and the normalcy conceptions.
Keywords risk  probability  normalcy  pluralism
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Reprint years 2019, 2020
DOI 10.1111/phpr.12598
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References found in this work BETA

Thinking, Fast and Slow.Daniel Kahneman - 2011 - New York: New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

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Citations of this work BETA

Evidence, Risk, and Proof Paradoxes: Pessimism About the Epistemic Project.Giada Fratantonio - 2021 - International Journal of Evidence and Proof:online first.
Risky Belief.Martin Smith - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
Epistemic Entitlement, Epistemic Risk and Leaching.Luca Moretti & Crispin Wright - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.

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