British Journal for the History of Philosophy 22 (1):4-24 (2014)
AbstractI argue that Meno’s Paradox targets the type of knowledge that Socrates has been looking for earlier in the dialogue: knowledge grounded in explanatory definitions. Socrates places strict requirements on definitions and thinks we need these definitions to acquire knowledge. Meno’s challenge uses Socrates’ constraints to argue that we can neither propose definitions nor recognize them. To understand Socrates’ response to the challenge, we need to view Meno’s challenge and Socrates’ response as part of a larger disagreement about the value of inquiry.
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References found in this work
Inquiry in the Meno.Gail Fine - 1992 - In R. Kraut (ed.), Cambridge Companion to Plato. Cambridge University Press.
Citations of this work
Is Plato an Innatist in the Meno?David Bronstein & Whitney Schwab - 2019 - Phronesis 64 (4):392-430.
Why Are There Two Versions of Meno’s Paradox?Douglas A. Shepardson - forthcoming - Southern Journal of Philosophy.
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