Epistemology without concepts? [Book Review]

Metascience 27 (1):117-121 (2018)

Authors
Santiago Echeverri
New York University
Abstract
Review of Penelope Maddy, What Do Philosophers Do? Skepticism and the Practice of Philosophy (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2017, 248 pp.)
Keywords Skepticism  Metaphilosophy  Dream  Concepts
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Reprint years 2018
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DOI 10.1007/s11016-017-0263-1
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A Plea for Excuses.John Austin - 1956 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 57:1--30.

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