Journal of Philosophy 117 (9):473-500 (2020)

Authors
Santiago Echeverri
National Autonomous University of Mexico
Abstract
The rule account of self-conscious thought holds that a thought is self-conscious if and only if it contains a token of a concept-type that is governed by a reflexive rule. An account along these lines was discussed in the late 70s. Nevertheless, very few philosophers endorse it nowadays. I shall argue that this summary dismissal is partly unjustified. There is one version of the rule account that can explain a key epistemic property of self-conscious thoughts: Guarantee. Along the way, I will rebut a number of objections and introduce two constraints on how the reflexive rule is implemented.
Keywords I-thoughts  Self-consciousness  I-concept  Self
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DOI 10.5840/jphil2020117930
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