Putting I-Thoughts to Work

Journal of Philosophy 118 (7):345-372 (2021)
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Abstract

A traditional view holds that the self-concept is essentially indexical. In a highly influential article, Ruth Millikan famously held that the self-concept should be understood as a Millian name with a sui generis functional role. This article presents a novel explanatory argument against the Millian view and in favor of the indexical view. The argument starts from a characterization of the self-concept as a device of information integration. It then shows that the indexical view yields a better explanation of the integration function than the Millian view. The resulting account can rebut Millikan’s objections and it has broader implications for the debate on the essential indexical.

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Santiago Echeverri
National Autonomous University of Mexico

Citations of this work

Born believer?Mark Siderits - 2021 - Comparative Philosophy 12 (1).

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References found in this work

Attitudes de dicto and de se.David Lewis - 1979 - Philosophical Review 88 (4):513-543.
Advertisement for a Semantics for Psychology.Ned Block - 1986 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10 (1):615-678.
Inverted earth.Ned Block - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:53-79.
Frege on demonstratives.John Perry - 1977 - Philosophical Review 86 (4):474-497.

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