Three Arguments from Temporary Intrinsics

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):605-619 (2010)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The Argument from Temporary Intrinsics is one of the canonical arguments against endurantism. I show that the two standard ways of presenting the argument have limited force. I then present a new version of the argument, which provides a more promising articulation of the underlying objection to endurantism. However, the premises of this argument conflict with the gauge theories of particle physics, and so this version of the argument is no more successful than its predecessors. I conclude that no version of the Argument from Temporary Intrinsics gives us a compelling reason to favor one theory of persistence over another

Similar books and articles

The argument from temporary intrinsics.Ryan Wasserman - 2003 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (3):413 – 419.
Temporary intrinsics and relativization.M. Oreste Fiocco - 2010 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (1):64-77.
How Coincidence Bears on Persistence.Pablo Rychter - 2011 - Philosophia 39 (4):759-770.
Endurance and Temporary Intrinsics.Sally Haslanger - 1989 - Analysis 49 (3):119-125.
McTaggart and indexing the copula.Bradley Rettler - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 158 (3):431-434.

Analytics

Added to PP
2010-08-06

Downloads
355 (#32,840)

6 months
64 (#18,724)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Maya Eddon
University of Massachusetts, Amherst

Citations of this work

Primitivism About Intrinsicality.Alexander Skiles - 2014 - In Robert M. Francescotti (ed.), Companion to Intrinsic Properties. De Gruyter. pp. 221-252.
Relativity and Degrees of Relationality.Jack Spencer - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (2):432-459.

View all 12 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Wiley-Blackwell.
New work for a theory of universals.David K. Lewis - 1983 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (4):343-377.
New Work For a Theory of Universals.David Lewis - 1983 - In D. H. Mellor & Alex Oliver (eds.), Properties. Oxford University Press.
From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis.Frank Jackson - 1999 - Philosophical Quarterly 49 (197):539-542.

View all 19 references / Add more references