Erkenntnis 80 (3):657-673 (2015)

Authors
Anna-Maria Asunta Eder
University of Cologne
Abstract
In the literature, one finds two accounts of the normative status of rational belief: the ought account and the permissibility account. Both accounts have their advantages and shortcomings, making it difficult to favour one over the other. Imagine that there were two principles of rational belief or rational degrees of belief commonly considered plausible, but which, however, yielded a paradox together with one account, but not with the other. One of the accounts therefore requires us to give up one of the plausible principles; whereas the other allows us to save them both. The fact that it allows us to save both of the plausible principles might well be considered a strong reason in favour of the relevant account. The permissibility-account-based resolution of the lottery paradox suggests that the permissibility account is a candidate for being supported in this way, since the account seems to save two plausible principles of rational belief and rational degrees of belief. I argue that even if the permissibility account were supported in this way the support would be defeated, since one cannot provide an analogous resolution of the preface paradox. The principles remain unsaved by the permissibility account.
Keywords Epistemic Norms,  Rational Belief,  Justified Belief,  Lottery Paradox,  Preface Paradox,  Lockean Thesis,  Conjunction Closure,  Formal Epistemology,  Epistemic Paradoxes,  Reasons and Oughts,
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Reprint years 2015
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DOI 10.1007/s10670-014-9709-7
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References found in this work BETA

Probability and the Logic of Rational Belief.Henry E. Kyburg Jr - 1961 - Middletown, CT, USA: Wesleyan University Press.
Probability and the Logic of Rational Belief.Henry Ely Kyburg - 1961 - Middletown, CT, USA: Middletown, Conn., Wesleyan University Press.
Evidentialism.Richard Feldman & Earl Conee - 1985 - Philosophical Studies 48 (1):15 - 34.

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Citations of this work BETA

A Bitter Pill for Closure.Marvin Backes - 2019 - Synthese 196:3773-3787.
The Hardest Paradox for Closure.Martin Smith - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-26.

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