From relative confirmation to real confirmation

Philosophy of Science 55 (2):265-271 (1988)
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Abstract

Recent work on the logical theory of confirmation has centered on accounts of the confirmation of hypotheses relative to auxiliary assumptions or background theory. Whether such relative confirmation actually increases the credibility of the (relatively) confirmed hypothesis will depend in various ways on the epistemic status of the auxiliaries involved. Most obviously, if the auxiliaries are not themselves credible, confirmation relative to them will not increase the credibility of the hypothesis thus confirmed. A complete theory of confirmation must thus combine an account of relative confirmation with an account of the route from relative confirmation to real confirmation. Some recent criticisms of hypothetico-deductive and bootstrapping accounts of relative confirmation are undermined by failure to appreciate the limitations of relative confirmation

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Aron Edidin
New College of Florida

Citations of this work

The irrelevance of bootstrapping.David Christensen - 1990 - Philosophy of Science 57 (4):644-662.
Toward a defensible bootstrapping.Sam Mitchell - 1995 - Philosophy of Science 62 (2):241-260.
Bootstrapping and Content Parts.Ken Gemes - 2006 - Erkenntnis 64 (3):345-370.

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References found in this work

Philosophy of Natural Science.Carl G. Hempel - 1967 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 18 (1):70-72.
Glymour on evidential relevance.David Christensen - 1983 - Philosophy of Science 50 (3):471-481.
Hypothetico-deductivism is hopeless.Clark Glymour - 1980 - Philosophy of Science 47 (2):322-325.
Revisions of bootstrap testing.Clark Glymour - 1983 - Philosophy of Science 50 (4):626-629.
Glymour on confirmation.Aron Edidin - 1981 - Philosophy of Science 48 (2):292-307.

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