Glymour on confirmation

Philosophy of Science 48 (2):292-307 (1981)
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Abstract

Glymour has developed an account of the confirmation of scientific hypotheses which he advocates as an alternative to the hypothetico-deductive and Bayesian accounts. This account is subject to a counter-example which may be accomodated by a slight modification. So modified it describes an important dimension of confirmation. If the modification of Glymour's account is slightly extended, both the resulting account and the hypothetico-deductive account may be seen as special cases of a Bayesian theory which is immune to Glymour's criticisms

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Aron Edidin
New College of Florida

Citations of this work

Glymour on evidential relevance.David Christensen - 1983 - Philosophy of Science 50 (3):471-481.
The irrelevance of bootstrapping.David Christensen - 1990 - Philosophy of Science 57 (4):644-662.
Solving the Tacking Problem with Contrast Classes.Jake Chandler - 2007 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58 (3):489-502.
From relative confirmation to real confirmation.Aron Edidin - 1988 - Philosophy of Science 55 (2):265-271.

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References found in this work

Three Grades of Modal Involvement.W. V. Quine - 1976 - In Willard Van Orman Quine (ed.), The ways of paradox, and other essays. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. pp. 158-176.
Relevant evidence.Clark Glymour - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (14):403-426.
An appraisal of Glymour's confirmation theory.Paul Horwich - 1978 - Journal of Philosophy 75 (2):98-113.

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