Concept referentialism and the role of empty concepts

Mind and Language 25 (1):89-118 (2010)
This paper defends a reference-based approach to concept individuation against the objection that such an approach is unable to make sense of concepts that fail to refer. The main line of thought pursued involves clarifying how the referentialist should construe the relationship between a concept's (referential) content and its role in mental processes. While the central goal of the paper is to defend a view aptly titled Concept Referentialism , broader morals are drawn regarding reference-based approaches in general. The paper closes by calling for a shift in the current debate between referentialists and their opponents.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0017.2009.01382.x
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 24,411
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

View all 43 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Kevan Edwards (2009). What Concepts Do. Synthese 170 (2):289 - 310.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

76 ( #64,003 of 1,924,749 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

8 ( #107,577 of 1,924,749 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.