Nondoxasticism about Self‐Deception

Dialectica 67 (3):265-282 (2013)

Authors
Sophie Alice Archer
Oxford University
Abstract
The philosophical difficulties presented by self-deception are vexed and multifaceted. One such difficulty is what I call the ‘doxastic problem’ of self-deception. Solving the doxastic problem involves determining whether someone in a state of self-deception that ∼p both believes that p and believes that ∼p, simply holds one or the other belief, or, as I will argue, holds neither. This final option, which has been almost entirely overlooked to-date, is what I call ‘ nondoxasticism ’ about self-deception. In this article, I present a negative case for nondoxasticism according to which, in the paradigm case of self-deception, there is no explanatory need to attribute the self-deceived person either their undesired belief that p, or their desired belief that ∼p. Folk psychology is replete with concepts other than belief, and if we bear this in mind, it becomes clear that the explanatory roles for which the self-deceived person's purported beliefs have traditionally been enlisted can be comfortably filled without recourse to belief.
Keywords self-deception
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DOI 10.1111/1746-8361.12030
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References found in this work BETA

The Possibility of Practical Reason.David Velleman - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Doxastic Deliberation.Nishi Shah & J. David Velleman - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (4):497-534.
How Truth Governs Belief.Nishi Shah - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (4):447-482.

View all 26 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Willful Ignorance and Self-Deception.Kevin Lynch - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (2):505-523.
Why ‘Believes’ is Not a Vague Predicate.Sophie Archer - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (12):3029-3048.
Literal Self-Deception.Maiya Jordan - forthcoming - Analysis:anz053.
Secondary Self‐Deception.Maiya Jordan - 2019 - Ratio 32 (2):122-130.

View all 8 citations / Add more citations

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