Prizing truth from warranted assertibility: Reply to Tennant

Analysis 59 (4):300–308 (1999)
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Abstract

Crispin Wright has argued that an antirealist should not equate truth with warrant. Neil Tennant has disputed this. This paper continues the discussion with Tennant. Firstly, it expands upon the radical difference between Tennant's conception of a warrant and Wright's. Secondly, it shows that, even if we were to adopt Tennant's own conception of a warrant, there is a reading available to Wright of 'There is no warrant for P' and of 'There is a warrant for not-P' such that the latter does not follow from the former, as Wright claimed. Finally, it is shown that, pace Tennant, superassertibility does have a role to play in Tennant's own conception of a warrant

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