Rawls versus utilitarianism: the subset objection

Authors
Terence Rajivan Edward
University of Manchester
Abstract
This paper presents an objection to John Rawls’s use of the original position method to argue against implementing utilitarian rules. The use of this method is pointless because a small subset of the premises Rawls relies on can be used to infer the same conclusion.
Keywords original position  utilitarianism  the separateness of persons
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References found in this work BETA

A Theory of Justice.John Rawls - 1971 - Harvard University Press.
Rawls and Utilitarianism.Holly Smith Goldman - 1980 - In Gene Blocker & Elizabeth Smith (eds.), John Rawls' Theory of Social Justice. Ohio University Press.

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