Truth as a Substantive Property

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (2):279-294 (2013)

Authors
Douglas Edwards
Utica College
Abstract
One of the many ways that ?deflationary? and ?inflationary? theories of truth are said to differ is in their attitude towards truth qua property. This difference used to be very easy to delineate, with deflationists denying, and inflationists asserting, that truth is a property, but more recently the debate has become a lot more complicated, owing primarily to the fact that many contemporary deflationists often do allow for truth to be considered a property. Anxious to avoid inflation, however, these deflationists are at pains to point out that the truth property, on their view, is not a property of any significant interest. Correspondingly, inflationists have seen this as an opportunity to refine what kind of property they think truth is, which?according to them?moves their views beyond deflationism. The upshot of this is that there are number of different accounts in the literature of what distinguishes an inflationary truth property from a deflationary one, or?as it is sometimes put?what distinguishes a ?substantive? property from an ?insubstantive? one. This has made it hard to pin down exactly what is at issue at the metaphysical level between deflationists and inflationists, which makes it increasingly hard to see how debates between them are properly phrased. Given that these positions represent the two central attitudes towards truth in contemporary debates, this makes for a serious obstacle for the project of discerning the correct theory of truth. The aim of this paper is to discern the best way to distinguish between substantive and insubstantive properties, and thus to restore some focus to these debates. I argue that the three central distinctions in the literature fail, and offer what I take to be a more promising distinction in terms of a graded distinction between abundant and sparse properties
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2013
ISBN(s)
DOI 10.1080/00048402.2012.686514
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 45,685
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Word and Object.W. QUINE - 1960 - MIT Press.
Writing the Book of the World.Theodore Sider - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.

View all 54 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

TRUTH: A Concept Unlike Any Other.Jamin Asay - forthcoming - Synthese:1-26.
The Many (yet Few) Faces of Deflationism.Jeremy Wyatt - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly (263):362-382.
From One to Many: Recent Work on Truth.Jeremy Wyatt & Michael Lynch - 2016 - American Philosophical Quarterly 53 (4):323-340.
Substantivism About Truth.Gila Sher - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (12):818-828.
The Role of Truth in Psychological Science.Jamin Asay - 2018 - Theory and Psychology 28 (3):382-397.

View all 14 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Against Truth.Jamin Asay - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (1):147-164.
Varieties of Deflationism.Dorit Bar-On & Keith Simmons - 2006 - In Ernest Lepore & Barry C. Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook to the Philosophy of Language. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Expressivism and Plural Truth.Michael P. Lynch - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (2):385-401.
Truth and Other Self-Effacing Properties.Chase B. Wrenn - 2004 - Philosophical Quarterly 54 (217):577–586.
On Alethic Disjunctivism.Douglas Edwards - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (1):200-214.
Truth-Bearers and Modesty.Manuel García-Carpintero - 2011 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 82 (1):49–75.
Truth and Multiple Realizability.Michael P. Lynch - 2004 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (3):384 – 408.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2012-05-26

Total views
84 ( #102,720 of 2,280,831 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
5 ( #249,587 of 2,280,831 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature