The descriptivist theory of names and the problem of paradoxical reputations

Abstract

This paper presents an objection to the theory of names according to which what a name refers to is determined by a description that the speaker or writer associates with that name. Some names are associated with paradoxical descriptions. I use the reputations of Henry Sidgwick and J.M.E. McTaggart to illustrate this problem.

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Terence Rajivan Edward
University of Manchester (PhD)

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On What Matters: Two-Volume Set.Derek Parfit - 2001 - New York: Oxford University Press.

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