Mind 111 (442):249-280 (2002)
Donald Dvaidson has claimed that a theory of meaning identifies the logical constants of the object language by treating them in the phrasal axioms of the theory, and that the theory entails a relation of logical consequence among the sentences of the object language. Section 1 offers a preliminary investigation of these claims. In Section 2 the claims are rebutted by appealing to Evans's paradigm of a theory of meaning. Evans's theory is deliberately blind to any relation of logical consequence among the sentences of the object language, and entails only what Evans takes to be a distinct and deeper relation of structural validity among the sentences of the object language. In Section 3 we turn to Evans's motivation in order to compare the two paradigms of a theory of meaning. Evans laid down criteria under which a theory of meaning gives what he called a ‘transcendent’ semantic classification of the lexicon of the object language, in contrast to a mere ‘immanent’ classification. However, when these criteria are applied we find that, pace Evans, they favour Davidson's paradigm over Evans's. In the final section we show that Evans's conception of structural consequence turns out to be a deeper formulation of logical consequence.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Truth and Meaning.Robert C. Cummins - 2002 - In Joseph Keim-Campbell, Michael O'Rourke & David Shier (eds.), Meaning and Truth: Investigations in Philosophical Semantics. Seven Bridges Press. pp. 175-197.
Theories of Meaning and Logical Truth: Edwards Versus Davidson.Miguel Hoeltje - 2007 - Mind 116 (461):121 - 129.
Names in Free Logical Truth Theory.Mark Sainsbury - 2005 - In José Luis Bermúdez (ed.), Thought, Reference, and Experience: Themes From the Philosophy of Gareth Evans. Clarendon Press.
Semantic Competence and Truth-Conditional Semantics.H. G. Callaway - 1988 - Erkenntnis 28 (1):3 - 27.
Names, Fictional Names, and 'Really'.R. M. Sainsbury - 1999 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 73 (1):243–269.
On Rules of Inference and the Meanings of Logical Constants.Panu Raatikainen - 2008 - Analysis 68 (300):282-287.
Is There Anthropological Evidence That Logic is Culturally Relative?: Remarks on Bloor, Jennings, and Evans-Pritchard.Timm Triplett - 1994 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45 (2):749-760.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads52 ( #99,355 of 2,158,677 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #354,589 of 2,158,677 )
How can I increase my downloads?