Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (2-3):210-211 (2010)

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Kevan Edwards
Syracuse University
Abstract
This commentary raises two concerns with Machery's approach in Doing without Concepts. The first concern is that it may be possible to preserve a unified theory of concepts by distinguishing facts about concept individuation from facts about cognitive structures and processes. The second concern questions the sharpness of the distinction Machery draws between psychological and philosophical conceptions of concepts
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DOI 10.1017/s0140525x10000543
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