What concepts do

Synthese 170 (2):289 - 310 (2009)
Abstract
This paper identifies and criticizes a line of reasoning that has played a substantial role in the widespread rejection of the view that Fodor has dubbed “Concept Atomism”. The line of reasoning is not only fallacious, but its application in the present case rests on a misconception about the explanatory potential of Concept Atomism. This diagnosis suggests the possibility of a new polemical strategy in support of Concept Atomism. The new strategy is more comprehensive than that which defenders of the view, namely Fodor, have employed.
Keywords Philosophy   Metaphysics   Philosophy of Language   Logic   Epistemology   Computer Science, general   Philosophy of Science
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s11229-009-9584-y
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 29,841
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Mind and World.John McDowell - 1994 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Naming and Necessity.Saul A. Kripke - 1980 - Harvard University Press.

View all 22 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Précis of Doing Without Concepts.Edouard Machery - 2010 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (2-3):195-206.
Précis of Doing Without Concepts.Edouard Machery - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 149 (3):602-611.
Précis of Doing Without Concepts.Edouard Machery - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 149 (3):401-410.

View all 8 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Concepts and Prototypes.James A. Hampton - 2000 - Mind and Language 15 (2-3):299-307.
How to Acquire a Concept.Eric Margolis - 1998 - Mind and Language 13 (3):347-369.
Is Conceptual Atomism a Plausible Theory of Concepts?Jack M. C. Kwong - 2007 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 45 (3):413-434.
Concepts: Where Fodor Went Wrong.A. Levine & Mark H. Bickhard - 1999 - Philosophical Psychology 12 (1):5-23.
Added to PP index
2009-07-13

Total downloads
141 ( #36,888 of 2,210,261 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
2 ( #225,618 of 2,210,261 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature