What concepts do

Synthese 170 (2):289 - 310 (2009)
Abstract
This paper identifies and criticizes a line of reasoning that has played a substantial role in the widespread rejection of the view that Fodor has dubbed “Concept Atomism”. The line of reasoning is not only fallacious, but its application in the present case rests on a misconception about the explanatory potential of Concept Atomism. This diagnosis suggests the possibility of a new polemical strategy in support of Concept Atomism. The new strategy is more comprehensive than that which defenders of the view, namely Fodor, have employed.
Keywords Philosophy   Metaphysics   Philosophy of Language   Logic   Epistemology   Computer Science, general   Philosophy of Science
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-009-9584-y
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References found in this work BETA
Mind and World.John McDowell - 1994 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Naming and Necessity.Saul A. Kripke - 1980 - Harvard University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
Précis of Doing Without Concepts.Edouard Machery - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 149 (3):602-611.
Précis of Doing Without Concepts.Edouard Machery - 2010 - Mind and Language 25 (5):602-611.
Précis of Doing Without Concepts.Edouard Machery - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 149 (3):401-410.

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