Synthese 170 (2):289 - 310 (2009)

Authors
Kevan Edwards
Syracuse University
Abstract
This paper identifies and criticizes a line of reasoning that has played a substantial role in the widespread rejection of the view that Fodor has dubbed “Concept Atomism”. The line of reasoning is not only fallacious, but its application in the present case rests on a misconception about the explanatory potential of Concept Atomism. This diagnosis suggests the possibility of a new polemical strategy in support of Concept Atomism. The new strategy is more comprehensive than that which defenders of the view, namely Fodor, have employed.
Keywords Philosophy   Metaphysics   Philosophy of Language   Logic   Epistemology   Computer Science, general   Philosophy of Science
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s11229-009-9584-y
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 64,132
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Two Dogmas of Empiricism.W. Quine - 1951 - [Longmans, Green].
Mind and World.John McDowell - 1994 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

View all 30 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Précis of Doing Without Concepts.Edouard Machery - 2010 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (2-3):195-206.
Précis of Doing Without Concepts.Edouard Machery - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 149 (3):602-611.
Précis of Doing Without Concepts.Edouard Machery - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 149 (3):401-410.
Précis of Doing Without Concepts.Edouard Machery - 2010 - Mind and Language 25 (5):602-611.

View all 8 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-07-13

Total views
162 ( #66,392 of 2,454,817 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
7 ( #98,232 of 2,454,817 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes