Philosophy of Science 53 (2):223-245 (1986)

Elliott Sober
University of Wisconsin, Madison
One of us (Eells 1982) has defended traditional evidential decision theory against prima facie Newcomb counterexamples by assuming that a common cause forms a conjunctive fork with its joint effects. In this paper, the evidential theory is defended without this assumption. The suggested rationale shows that the theory's assumptions are not about the nature of causality, but about the nature of rational deliberation. These presuppositions are weak enough for the argument to count as a strong justification of the evidential theory
Keywords Decision Theory
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DOI 10.1086/289308
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