Introducing a non-physicalist conception of panpsychism

Dissertation, University of Reading (2009)
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Abstract

The aim of this [MA] dissertation is to provide an elementary example of a panpsychic universe. It is one in which – in contrast to physicalism – the experiential (defined in terms of the possession of a qualitative, subjective, structured percept) is the foundation of existence. In this panpsychism, physics is secondary because it is arrived at by collating the experiences of a collection of experiential entities as they perceive one another.

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