Undermining Motivations for Universalism
Noûs 45 (4):696-713 (2011)
Abstract
Universalism (the thesis that for any ys, those ys compose a further object) is an answer to the Special Composition Question. In the literature there are three arguments – what I call the arguments from elegance – that universalists often rely upon, but which are rarely examined in-depth. I argue that these motivations cannot be had by the perdurantist, for to avoid a commitment to badly behaved superluminal objects perdurantists must answer the ‘Proper Continuant Question’. Any answer to that question necessarily ensures that there is a restricted answer to the Special Composition Question that is just as elegant as universalism. Thus, if you are a perdurantist, the arguments from elegance fail to motivate universalism for there will always be a restricted composition that is just as goodAuthor's Profile
DOI
10.1111/j.1468-0068.2010.00779.x
My notes
Similar books and articles
Debunking a mereological myth: If composition as identity is true, universalism need not be.Nikk Effingham - manuscript
Restricted composition.Ned Markosian - 2008 - In Theodore Sider, John Hawthorne & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics. Blackwell. pp. 341--63.
Unrestricted Composition and Restricted Quantification.Daniel Z. Korman - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 140 (3):319-334.
In defense of mereological universalism.Michael C. Rea - 1998 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (2):347-360.
Composition as a secondary quality.Uriah Kriegel - 2008 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (3):359-383.
Analytics
Added to PP
2010-12-22
Downloads
95 (#131,669)
6 months
2 (#299,341)
2010-12-22
Downloads
95 (#131,669)
6 months
2 (#299,341)
Historical graph of downloads
Author's Profile
Citations of this work
Endurantism and Perdurantism.Nikk Effingham - 2012 - In Robert Barnard Neil Manson (ed.), Continuum Companion to Metaphysics. pp. 170.
References found in this work
Four Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time.Theodore Sider - 2001 - Oxford University Press.