Universalism, vagueness and supersubstantivalism

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (1):35 – 42 (2009)
Sider has a favourable view of supersubstantivalism (the thesis that all material objects are identical to the regions of spacetime that they occupy). This paper argues that given supersubstantivalism, Sider's argument from vagueness for (mereological) universalism fails. I present Sider's vagueness argument (§§II-III), and explain why - given supersubstantivalism - some but not all regions must be concrete in order for the argument to work (§IV). Given this restriction on what regions can be concrete, I give a reductio of Sider's argument (§V). I conclude with some brief comments on why this is not simply an ad hominem against Sider, and why this incompatibility of supersubstantivalism with the argument from vagueness is of broader interest (§VI).
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DOI 10.1080/00048400802215422
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Daniel Z. Korman (2016). Ordinary Objects. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Emily Thomas (2013). Space, Time, and Samuel Alexander. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 21 (3):549-569.

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