Is metaphysical nihilism interesting?

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (2):210-231 (2009)
Abstract
Suppose nothing exists. Then it is true that nothing exists. What makes that true? Nothing! So it seems that if nothing existed, then the principle that every truth is made true by something (the truthmaker principle) would be false. So if it is possible that nothing exists, a claim often called 'metaphysical nihilism', then the truthmaker principle is not necessary. This paper explores various ways to resolve this conflict without restricting metaphysical nihilism in such a way that it would become trivial and uninteresting.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2009.01337.x
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Truth and Truthmakers.D. M. Armstrong - 2004 - Cambridge University Press.
A World of States of Affairs.D. M. Armstrong - 1993 - Philosophical Perspectives 7 (3):429-440.
Truthmaking and Difference-Making.David Lewis - 2001 - Noûs 35 (4):602–615.

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