Authors
David Efird
University of York
Abstract
We argue that genuine modal realism can be extended, rather than modified, so as to allow for the possibility of nothing concrete, a possibility we term ‘metaphysical nihilism’. The issue should be important to the genuine modal realist because, not only is metaphysical nihilism itself intuitively plausible, but also it is supported by an argument with pre-theoretically credible premises, namely, the subtraction argument. Given the soundness of the subtraction argument, we show that there are two ways that the genuine modal realist can accommodate metaphysical nihilism: (i) by allowing for worlds containing only spatiotemporal points and (ii) by allowing for a world containing nothing but the null individual. On methodological grounds, we argue that the genuine modal realist should reject the former way but embrace the latter way.
Keywords modal realism  substraction argument  metaphysical nihilism
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

New Work for a Theory of Universals.David Lewis - 1983 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (4):343-377.
Truthmaking and Difference-Making.David K. Lewis - 2001 - Noûs 35 (4):602–615.
Against Structural Universals.David K. Lewis - 1986 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64 (1):25 – 46.
Ontology and Ideology.W. V. Quine - 1951 - Philosophical Studies 2 (1):11 - 15.

View all 15 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Mereology.Achille C. Varzi - 2016 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Is Metaphysical Nihilism Interesting?David Efird & Tom Stoneham - 2009 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (2):210-231.

View all 8 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Justifying Metaphysical Nihilism: A Response to Cameron.David Efird & Tom Stoneham - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (234):132-137.
Modal Humeanism and Arguments From Possibility.Margot Strohminger - 2013 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 113 (3pt3):391-401.
The Accidental Properties of Numbers and Properties.Harold Noonan & Mark Jago - 2012 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (2):134-140.
Advanced Modalizing Problems.Mark Jago - 2016 - Mind 125 (499):627-642.
World and Object: Metaphysical Nihilism and Three Accounts of Worlds.Geraldine Coggins - 2003 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 103 (3):353–360.
A Kantian Critique of David Lewis's Modal Realism.Thomas Doty Eudaly - 1989 - Dissertation, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Analytics

Added to PP index
2010-07-27

Total views
307 ( #24,693 of 2,362,031 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
28 ( #26,550 of 2,362,031 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes