Mind and Language 35 (3):368-376 (2020)

Authors
Frances Egan
Rutgers University - New Brunswick
Abstract
Nicholas Shea offers Varitel Semantics as a naturalistic account of mental content. I argue that the account secures determinate content only by appeal to pragmatic considerations, and so it fails to respect naturalism. But that is fine, because representational content is not, strictly speaking, necessary for explanation in cognitive science. Even in Shea’s own account, content serves only a variety of heuristic functions.
Keywords cognitive science  content  explanation  heuristic  naturalism  representation
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DOI 10.1111/mila.12276
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References found in this work BETA

Knowing One's Own Mind.Donald Davidson - 1987 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 60 (3):441-458.
How to Think About Mental Content.Frances Egan - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (1):115-135.
Misrepresenting and Malfunctioning.Karen Neander - 1995 - Philosophical Studies 79 (2):109-41.
Misrepresenting & Malfunctioning.Karen Neander - 1995 - Philosophical Studies 79 (2):109-141.

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Citations of this work BETA

Representation in Cognitive Science: Replies.Nicholas Shea - 2020 - Mind and Language 35 (3):402-412.

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