Authors
Frances Egan
Rutgers University - New Brunswick
Abstract
The computational theory of mind construes the mind as an information-processor and cognitive capacities as essentially representational capacities. Proponents of the view claim a central role for representational content in computational models of these capacities. In this paper I argue that the standard view of the role of representational content in computational models is mistaken; I argue that representational content is to be understood as a gloss on the computational characterization of a cognitive process.Keywords: Computation; Representational content; Cognitive capacities; Explanation
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DOI 10.1016/j.shpsa.2010.07.009
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References found in this work BETA

Vision.David Marr - 1982 - W. H. Freeman.
The Language of Thought.Jerry A. Fodor - 1975 - Harvard University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

How to Think About Mental Content.Frances Egan - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (1):115-135.
Data models, representation and adequacy-for-purpose.Alisa Bokulich & Wendy Parker - 2021 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 11 (1):1-26.
Representation in Cognitive Science: Replies.Nicholas Shea - 2020 - Mind and Language 35 (3):402-412.

View all 34 citations / Add more citations

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