Explaining representation: a reply to Matthen

Philosophical Studies (1):1-6 (2013)
Authors
Frances Egan
Rutgers University - New Brunswick
Abstract
Mohan Matthen has failed to understand the position I develop and defend in “How to Think about Mental Content.” No doubt some of the fault lies with my exposition, though Matthen often misconstrues passages that are clear in context. He construes clarifications and elaborations of my argument to be “concessions.” Rather than dwell too much on specific misunderstandings of my explanatory project and its attendant claims, I will focus on the main points of disagreement.RepresentationalismMy project in the paper is to argue for a particular construal of the role of representational content in computational models of cognition. The view is committed to two kinds of representational content—mathematical content, which characterizes the mathematical function computed by a device and subsumes both biological and artifactual computers, and cognitive content. The latter is determined in part by external, so-called ‘naturalistic’ factors (for example, visual mechanisms represent such distal pro
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-013-0166-y
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References found in this work BETA

The Intrinsic Quality of Experience.Gilbert Harman - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:31-52.
How to Think About Mental Content.Frances Egan - 2013 - Philosophical Studies (1):1-21.

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Citations of this work BETA

Beliefs as Inner Causes: The (Lack of) Evidence.Devin Sanchez Curry - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (6):850-877.

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