In defence of narrow mindedness

Mind and Language 14 (2):177-94 (1999)
Abstract
Externalism about the mind holds that the explanation of our representational capacities requires appeal to mental states that are individuated by reference to features of the environment. Externalists claim that ‘narrow’ taxonomies cannot account for important features of psychological explanation. I argue that this claim is false, and offer a general argument for preferring narrow taxonomies in psychology
Keywords Environment  Externalism  Metaphysics  Mind  Narrow
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DOI 10.1111/1468-0017.00108
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Computation Without Representation.Gualtiero Piccinini - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 137 (2):205-241.
How to Think About Mental Content.Frances Egan - 2013 - Philosophical Studies (1):1-21.
Functionalism, Computationalism, and Mental Contents.Gualtiero Piccinini - 2004 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34 (3):375-410.
Computational Models: A Modest Role for Content.Frances Egan - 2010 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 (3):253-259.

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