Quasi-realism and fundamental moral error

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (2):205 – 219 (2007)
Authors
Andy Egan
Rutgers University - New Brunswick
Abstract
A common first reaction to expressivist and quasi-realist theories is the thought that, if these theories are right, there's some objectionable sense in which we can't be wrong about morality. This worry turns out to be surprisingly difficult to make stick - an account of moral error as instability under improving changes provides the quasi-realist with the resources to explain many of our concerns about moral error. The story breaks down, though, in the case of fundamental moral error. This is where the initial worry finally sticks - quasi-realism tells me that I can't be fundamentally wrong about morality, though others can.
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DOI 10.1080/00048400701342988
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References found in this work BETA

Thinking How to Live.Allan Gibbard - 2003 - Harvard University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Can Expressivism Have It All?Terence Cuneo - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-23.
Truth and A Priori Possibility: Egan's Charge Against Quasi-Realism.Simon Blackburn - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (2):201-213.
Recent Work in Expressivism.Neil Sinclair - 2009 - Analysis 69 (1):136-147.
What is the Problem with Fundamental Moral Error?Sebastian Köhler - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (1):161-165.

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