Some counterexamples to causal decision theory

Philosophical Review 116 (1):93-114 (2007)

Authors
Andy Egan
Rutgers University - New Brunswick
Abstract
Many philosophers (myself included) have been converted to causal decision theory by something like the following line of argument: Evidential decision theory endorses irrational courses of action in a range of examples, and endorses “an irrational policy of managing the news”. These are fatal problems for evidential decision theory. Causal decision theory delivers the right results in the troublesome examples, and does not endorse this kind of irrational news-managing. So we should give up evidential decision theory, and be causal decision theorists instead. Unfortunately, causal decision theory has its own family of problematic examples for which it endorses irrational courses of action, and its own irrational policy that it is committed to endorsing. These are, I think, fatal problems for causal decision theory. I wish that I had another theory to offer in its place.
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DOI 10.1215/00318108-2006-023
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References found in this work BETA

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Citations of this work BETA

Epistemic Decision Theory.Hilary Greaves - 2013 - Mind 122 (488):915-952.
Why Take Both Boxes?Jack Spencer & Ian Wells - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (1):27-48.
Normative Decision Theory.Edward Elliott - 2019 - Analysis 79 (4):755-772.
Causal Decision Theory and Decision Instability.Brad Armendt - 2019 - Journal of Philosophy 116 (5):263-277.

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Causal Decision Theory.David Lewis - 1981 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 59 (1):5 – 30.
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