Secondary qualities and self-location

Authors
Andy Egan
Rutgers University - New Brunswick
Abstract
Colors aren't as real as shapes. Shapes are full?fledged qualities of things in themselves, independent of how they're perceived and by whom. Colors aren't. Colors are merely qualities of things as they are for us, and the colors of things depend on who is perceiving them. When we take the fully objective view of the world, things keep their shapes, but the colors fall away, revealed as the mere artifacts of our own subjective, parochial perspective on the world that they are
Keywords Centered Worlds
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DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2006.tb00492.x
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References found in this work BETA

The View From Nowhere.Thomas Nagel - 1986 - Oxford University Press.
Counterfactuals.David K. Lewis - 1973 - Blackwell.
Epistemic Modals, Relativism and Assertion.Andy Egan - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 133 (1):1--22.
Attitudes de Dicto and de Se.David Lewis - 1979 - Philosophical Review 88 (4):513-543.

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Citations of this work BETA

De Se Attitudes: Ascription and Communication.Dilip Ninan - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (7):551-567.
Billboards, Bombs and Shotgun Weddings.Andy Egan - 2009 - Synthese 166 (2):251-279.
Color Relationalism and Relativism.Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert - 2017 - Topics in Cognitive Science 9 (1):172-192.
Relativist Dispositional Theories of Value.Andy Egan - 2012 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 50 (4):557-582.

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