In Mark Sprevak & Matteo Colombo (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Computational Mind. Routledge (2018)

Authors
Frances Egan
Rutgers University - New Brunswick
Abstract
Much of computational cognitive science construes human cognitive capacities as representational capacities, or as involving representation in some way. Computational theories of vision, for example, typically posit structures that represent edges in the distal scene. Neurons are often said to represent elements of their receptive fields. Despite the ubiquity of representational talk in computational theorizing there is surprisingly little consensus about how such claims are to be understood. The point of this chapter is to sketch an account of the nature and function of representation in computational cognitive models.
Keywords representation, content, cognition, computation
Categories (categorize this paper)
Buy the book Find it on Amazon.com
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Vision.David Marr - 1982 - W. H. Freeman.

View all 42 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Folk Psychology as a Theory.Ian Martin Ravenscroft - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
The Computational Theory of Mind.Steven Horst - 2005 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

View all 9 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Computational Models: A Modest Role for Content.Frances Egan - 2010 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 (3):253-259.
Computation, Individuation, and the Received View on Representation.Mark Sprevak - 2010 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 (3):260-270.
The Enactive Automaton as a Computing Mechanism.Joe Dewhurst & Mario Villalobos - 2017 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 6 (3):185-192.
A Deflationary Account of Mental Representation.Frances Egan - 2020 - In Joulia Smortchkova, Krzysztof Dolega & Tobias Schlicht (eds.), Mental Representations. New York, USA: Oxford University Press.
Content, Computation and Externalism.Oron Shagrir - 2001 - Mind 110 (438):369-400.
A Clearer Vision.Lawrence A. Shapiro - 1997 - Philosophy of Science 64 (1):131-53.
Representational Content in Cognitive Psychology.Lawrence Andrew Shapiro - 1992 - Dissertation, University of Pennsylvania

Analytics

Added to PP index
2018-09-16

Total views
458 ( #18,582 of 2,462,308 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
90 ( #7,741 of 2,462,308 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes