Epistemic internalism and testimonial justification

Episteme 17 (4):458-474 (2020)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

ABSTRACTAccording to epistemic internalists, facts about justification supervene upon one's internal reasons for believing certain propositions. Epistemic externalists, on the other hand, deny this. More specifically, externalists think that the supervenience base of justification isn't exhausted by one's internal reasons for believing certain propositions. In the last decade, the internalism–externalism debate has made its mark on the epistemology of testimony. The proponent of internalism about the epistemology of testimony claims that a hearer's testimonial justification for believing that p supervenes upon his internal reasons for thinking that the speaker's testimony that p is true. Recently, however, several objections have been raised against this view. In this paper, I present an argument providing intuitive support for internalism about the epistemology of testimony. Moreover, I also defend the argument against three recent objections offered by Stephen Wright in a couple of recent papers. The upshot of my discussion is that external conditions do make an epistemic difference when it comes to our testimonial beliefs, but that they cannot make any difference with respect to their justificatory status – i.e., they are justificationally irrelevant.

Similar books and articles

Epistemic Internalism.Bjc Madison - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (10):840-853.
Internalism and Externalism in the Epistemology of Testimony.Mikkel Gerken - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (3):532-557.
Deontology and Defeat.Michael Bergmann - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (1):87-102.
Deontology and defeat.Michael Bergmann - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (1):87-102.
A dilemma for internalism?Thomas M. Crisp - 2010 - Synthese 174 (3):355-366.
A Critical Introduction to Testimony.Axel Gelfert - 2014 - New York: Bloomsbury Academic.

Analytics

Added to PP
2018-12-06

Downloads
490 (#36,574)

6 months
106 (#35,420)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Jonathan Egeland
University of Agder

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Justification and the Truth-Connection.Clayton Littlejohn - 2012 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
The structure of empirical knowledge.Laurence BonJour - 1985 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Theory of knowledge.Roderick M. Chisholm - 1966 - Englewood Cliffs, N.J.,: Prentice-Hall.

View all 60 references / Add more references