Mind 119 (475):549-584 (2010)

Authors
Ben Eggleston
University of Kansas
Abstract
Practical equilibrium, like reflective equilibrium, is a way of deciding what to think about morality. It shares with reflective equilibrium the general thesis that there is some way in which a moral theory must, in order to be acceptable, answer to one’s moral intuitions, but it differs from reflective equilibrium in its specification of exactly how a moral theory must answer to one’s intuitions. Whereas reflective equilibrium focuses on a theory’s consistency with those intuitions, practical equilibrium also gives weight to a theory’s approval of one’s having those intuitions
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DOI 10.1093/mind/fzq036
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References found in this work BETA

Morals by Agreement.David Gauthier - 1986 - Oxford University Press.
Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals.Immanuel Kant - 1785/2002 - Oxford University Press.
The View From Nowhere.Thomas Nagel - 1986 - Behaviorism 15 (1):73-82.

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Accounting for the Data: Intuitions in Moral Theory Selection.Ben Eggleston - 2014 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (4):761-774.

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