Philosophical Studies 126 (3):449 - 462 (2005)

Authors
Ben Eggleston
University of Kansas
Abstract
A critical examination of the chapters on normative ethics in Peter Railton’s Facts, Values, and Norms: Essays Toward a Morality of Consequence. It is argued that Railton’s theory of sophisticated consequentialism effectively handles issues of pollution and moral dilemma that Railton discusses, and that Railton’s more recent proposal of “valoric consequentialism,” if coupled with a non-act-utilitarian standard of rightness of the kind Railton discusses, is vulnerable to objections to which sophisticated consequentialism is immune.
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-005-2315-4
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