Should Consequentialists Make Parfit's Second Mistake? A Refutation of Jackson

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (1):1–15 (2000)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Frank Jackson claims that consequentialists should hold the view that Derek Parfit labels the second ‘mistake in moral mathematics’, which is the view that “If some act is right or wrong because of . . . effects, the only relevant effects are the effects of this particular act.” But each of the three arguments that Jackson offers is unsound. The root of the problem is that in order to argue for the conclusion Jackson aims to establish (that consequentialists should not regard the second “mistake” as a mistake), one must presuppose an overly narrow, and hence distorted, understanding of what consequentialism is.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,923

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
61 (#269,722)

6 months
12 (#241,801)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Ben Eggleston
University of Kansas

Citations of this work

Collective harm and the inefficacy problem.Julia Nefsky - 2019 - Philosophy Compass 14 (4):e12587.
Causing Global Warming.Mattias Gunnemyr - 2019 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 22 (2):399-424.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references