Mind and Language 35 (1):48-66 (2020)

Authors
Miguel Egler
Tilburg University
Abstract
Recent empirical studies raise methodological concerns about the use of intuitions in philosophy. According to one prominent line of reply, these concerns are unwarranted since the empirical studies motivating them do not control for the putatively characteristic phenomenology of intuitions. This paper makes use of research on metacognitive states that have precisely this phenomenology to argue that the above reply fails. Furthermore, it shows that empirical findings about these metacognitive states can help philosophers make better informed assessments of their warrant for relying on intuitions in inquiry.
Keywords experimental philosophy  feeling of rightness  intuition  metacognition  phenomenalism  philosophical methodology
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DOI 10.1111/mila.12229
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References found in this work BETA

The Intellectual Given.John Bengson - 2015 - Mind 124 (495):707-760.
Intuitions and Experiments: A Defense of the Case Method in Epistemology.Jennifer Nagel - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (3):495-527.

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