Utilitas 3 (1):113-119 (1991)

Abstract
Maximizing want-satisfaction per se is a relatively unattractive aspiration, for it seems to assume that wants are somehow disembodied entities with independent moral claims all of their own. Actually, of course, they are possessed by particular people. What preference-utilitarians should be concerned with is how people's lives go—the fulfilment of their projects and the satisfaction of their desires. In an old-fashioned way of talking, it is happy people rather than happiness per se that utilitarians should be striving to produce.
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DOI 10.1017/S0953820800000893
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References found in this work BETA

Reasons and Persons.Joseph Margolis - 1986 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (2):311-327.
Responsibility for Self.Charles Taylor - 1976 - In Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (ed.), The Identities of Persons. University of California Press. pp. 281--99.
The Thread of Life by Richard Wollheim. [REVIEW]Norton Batkin - 1987 - Journal of Philosophy 84 (6):336-344.

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Sour Grapes, Rational Desires and Objective Consequentialism.M. Rickard - 1995 - Philosophical Studies 80 (3):279 - 303.

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