Australasian Journal of Philosophy 99 (3):504-516 (2021)

Authors
Johan E. Gustafsson
University of York
Abstract
According to the Psychological-Continuity Account of What Matters, you are justified in having special concern for the well-being of a person at a future time if and only if that person will be psychologically continuous with you as you are now. On some versions of the account, the psychological continuity is required be temporally ordered, whereas, on other versions, it is allowed to be temporally unordered. In this paper, I argue that the account is implausible if the psychological continuity is allowed to be temporally unordered. I also argue that, if the psychological continuity is required to be temporally ordered, it cannot plausibly be purely psychological (in the sense that the psychological continuity is not required to be caused through spatio-temporal continuity of a brain). The upshot is that no plausible version of the Psychological-Continuity Account of What Matters is purely psychological. So psychological continuity is not what matters in survival.
Keywords what matters in survival  psychological continuity  justified special concern  personal identity  non-branching clause
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DOI 10.1080/00048402.2020.1791193
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References found in this work BETA

On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Wiley-Blackwell.
Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man.Thomas Reid - 2002 - Cambridge University Press.
On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 178 (3):388-390.
The Constitution of Selves.Marya Schechtman (ed.) - 1996 - Cornell University Press.

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