Causation and causal factuals

Erkenntnis 25 (1):77 - 84 (1986)

Authors
Douglas Ehring
Southern Methodist University
Abstract
Martin bunzl in "causal factuals" ("erkenntnis" 21, 1984) attempts to adapt and improve upon an approach to causation associated with the counterfactual theory of causation. Bunzl proposes to use possible world semantics to analyze causal sentences without reference to counterfactuals. In this paper I argue that bunzl's analysis is subject to problem cases which bear a close resemblance to those which plague counterfactual theory
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/BF00173558
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 38,878
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Causation and Conditionals.Ernest Sosa (ed.) - 1974 - Oxford University Press.
The Nonreductivist's Trouble with Mental Causation.Jaegwon Kim - 1992 - In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press.
Causal Perception and Causal Cognition.James Woodward - 2008 - In Johannes Roessler, Hemdat Lerman & Naomi Eilan (eds.), Perception, Causation, and Objectivity. Oxford University Press.
Causation as Property Acquisition.S. D. Rieber - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 109 (1):53 - 74.
Causal Processes and Causal Interactions.Douglas Ehring - 1986 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1986:24 - 32.
Causal Factuals.Martin Bunzl - 1984 - Erkenntnis 21 (3):367 - 384.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
25 ( #290,760 of 2,319,033 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
9 ( #117,280 of 2,319,033 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature