Defending the possibility of a neutral functional theory of law

Authors
Kenneth M. Ehrenberg
University of Surrey
Abstract
I argue that there is methodological space for a functional explanation of the nature of law that does not commit the theorist to a view about the value of that function for society, nor whether law is the best means of accomplishing it. A functional explanation will nonetheless provide a conceptual framework for a better understanding of the nature of law. First I examine the proper role for function in a theory of law and then argue for the possibility of a neutral functional theory, addressing issues raised by Leslie Green, Stephen Perry, Michael Moore and John Finnis.
Keywords Philosophy of Law  Functionalism  Methodology  Jurisprudence
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DOI 10.1093/ojls/gqp001
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Can There Be an Artifact Theory of Law?Luka Burazin - 2016 - Ratio Juris 29 (3):385-401.
Functions in Jurisprudential Methodology.Kenneth M. Ehrenberg - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (5):447-456.

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