Law as Plan and Artefact

Jurisprudence 7 (2):325-340 (2016)
Authors
Kenneth M. Ehrenberg
University of Surrey
Abstract
Scott Shapiro’s theory that law is a social plan is helpful in seeing law essentially as a tool of human creation and as such is sympathetic to understanding law in terms of the social functions it performs, a method I argue for elsewhere. I focus here on two problems with the theory as presented. The planning theory does not adequately explain the persistence of law beyond the utility of those who implement it. Generally, plans can cease to exist as soon as those engaged in them have no more use for them. Laws however, must usually be declared invalid or otherwise nullified for them to have no further effect. Shapiro’s use of self-certification to explain how law is differentiated from other forms of social planning is ad hoc and threatens circularity when he admits it to be a matter of degree. Both of these issues can be better solved by seeing law as an institutionalised abstract artefact, with a greater emphasis upon the nature of institutions doing much of the work done by the idea of planning.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s)
DOI 10.1080/20403313.2016.1192318
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Self-Certification and the Moral Aims of the Law.Arthur Ripstein - 2012 - Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 25 (1):201-217.
Artifact Categorization. Trends and Problems.Massimiliano Carrara & Daria Mingardo - 2013 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (3):351-373.
Artifact Categorization and the Modal Theory of Artifact Function.Bence Nanay - 2013 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (3):515-526.
In Defense of Hart.Matthew H. Kramer - 2013 - In Wil Waluchow & Stefan Sciaraffa (eds.), Philosophical Foundations of the Nature of Law. Oxford University Press. pp. 22.
Software is an Abstract Artifact.Nurbay Irmak - 2012 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 86 (1):55-72.
On Hart's Category Mistake.Michael S. Green - 2013 - Legal Theory 19 (4):347-369.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2015-11-12

Total views
224 ( #24,554 of 2,313,327 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
17 ( #32,198 of 2,313,327 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature