Personal identity and time travel

Philosophical Studies 52 (3):427 - 433 (1987)
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Abstract

Memory theories of personal identity are subject to the difficulty that distinct simultaneous person stages may both stand in the memory relation to an earlier person stage. Apparently, Such theories entail that these two duplicate person stages are stages of the same person, A claim argued to be "obviously false". In this paper, I argue that the characteristics of these duplication cases usually cited to support this claim do not provide adequate evidence to make it cogent

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Douglas Ehring
Southern Methodist University

Citations of this work

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