Tropes: Properties, Objects, and Mental Causation

Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press (2011)
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Abstract

Properties and objects are everywhere, but remain a philosophical mystery. Douglas Ehring argues that the idea of tropes--properties and relations understood as particulars--provides the best foundation for a metaphysical account of properties and objects. He develops and defends a new theory of trope nominalism.

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Douglas Ehring
Southern Methodist University

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