Topoi 40 (5):1051-1062 (2021)

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Catherine Elisabeth Hundleby
University of Windsor
Abstract
Sanford Goldberg’s account of epistemic coverage constitutes a special case of Douglas Walton’s view that epistemic closure arises from dialectical argument. Walton’s pragmatic version of epistemic closure depends on dialectical norms for closing an argument, and epistemic coverage operates at the limits of argument closure because it minimizes dialectical exchange. Such closure works together with a shared hypothetical consideration to justify dismissal of surprising claims.
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DOI 10.1007/s11245-020-09693-3
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References found in this work BETA

Argumentation Schemes.Douglas Walton, Chris Reed & Fabrizio Macagno - 2008 - Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.
Fallacies.Charles Leonard Hamblin - 1970 - London, England: Vale Press.
Fallacies.C. L. Hamblin - 1970 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 160:492-492.

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