Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 43:181-202 (1998)
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| Abstract |
A representative expression of current thinking on the ‘problem of consciousness’ runs as follows. There is one, impenetrably hard problem; and a host of soluble, and in this sense easy problems. The hard problem is: how could a physical system yield subjective states? How could there be something it is like to be a physical system? This problem corresponds to a concept of consciousness invariably labelled ‘phenomenal consciousness’. It is here, with respect to phenomenal consciousness, that we encounter an ‘explanatory gap’, where it is this gap that makes the problem so hard. Nothing we can say about the workings of a physical system could begin to explain the existence and nature of subjective, phenomenal feel.
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| DOI | 10.1017/S1358246100004367 |
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References found in this work BETA
On a Confusion About a Function of Consciousness.Ned Block - 1995 - Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.
The Senses Considered as Perceptual Systems.D. W. Hamlyn & James J. Gibson - 1968 - Philosophical Review 77 (3):361.
Selective Attention and the Organization of Visual Information.John Duncan - 1984 - Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 113 (4):501-517.
Citations of this work BETA
Getting Feelings Into Emotional Experiences in the Right Way.Peter Goldie - 2009 - Emotion Review 1 (3):232-239.
XV- Shaping Our Mental Lives: On the Possibility of Mental Self-Regulation.Dorothea Debus - 2016 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 116 (3):341-365.
The phenomenology of embodied attention.Diego D’Angelo - 2020 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 19 (5):961-978.
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